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Abstract—In order to better manage the premiums and en-
courage safe driving, many commercial insurance companies (e.g.,
Geico, Progressive) are providing options for their customers to
install sensors on their vehicles which collect individual vehicle’s
traveling data. The driver’s insurance is linked to his/her driving
behavior. At the other end, through analyzing the historical
traveling data from a large number of vehicles, the insurance
company could build a classifier to predict a new driver’s driving
style: aggressive or defensive. However, collection of such vehicle
traveling data explicitly breaches the drivers’ personal privacy.
To tackle such privacy concerns, this paper presents a privacy-
preserving driving style recognition technique to securely predict
aggressive and defensive drivers for the insurance company
without compromising the privacy of all the participating parties.
The insurance company cannot learn any private information
from the vehicles, and vice-versa. Finally, the effectiveness and
efficiency of the privacy-preserving driving style recognition
technique are validated with experimental results.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the engineering innovations that will have a trans-
formative impact on the society over the next few decades
is the Connected Vehicles initiative [4]. The connectivity is
enabled through the use of wireless communication over a
dedicated spectrum to create local ad hoc networks of vehicles
that are then able to communicate with other vehicles in
its neighborhood, as well as with traffic infrastructure. The
communication network provides opportunity for mobile de-
vices or inertial sensors mounted in the vehicles to collect
data regarding vehicle travel, driver behavior, and location
data [19], [31]. This data can be processed for implementing
automatic collision avoidance, optimizing traffic in real time,
and planning for infrastructure needs. While, these data sets
can improve safety, reduce emissions, and reduce driver wait
time, they can also be used to uncover sensitive personal
information. For instance, location data can be used in criminal
investigations, driver behavior can be used to determine fault
in accidents, and a person’s lifestyle choices can be revealed
by processing the data with mapping software. The privacy
challenge needs to be addressed with a careful balance between
the utility of the collected data and the protection of personal
information as well as corporate proprietary information.
The insurance industry can leverage vehicle travel data to
determine their premiums by correlating driver behavior and
accidents. For instance, vehicle data can be used to create
a classification system that can classify drivers as defensive
or aggressive [19]. In order to better manage their premiums
and also encourage safe driving, many commercial insurance
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companies (e.g., GEICO and Progressive) are providing op-
tions for customers to install sensors on their vehicles that can
collect the vehicle’s operational parameters (such as braking,
acceleration, speed, etc.) [20]. Their insurance is linked to
their driving behavior. At the other end, through analyzing
the historical travel data from a large number of vehicles, the
insurance company could build a classifier to determine the
thresholds for aggressive vs. defensive driving. This would
allow the companies to better understand the risks associated
with each of their drivers and be able to tailor premiums
based on the risks. Insurance companies could also give drivers
“report cards” to help drivers better understand their own
driving habits. However, collection of the vehicle traveling
data to make this happen explicitly breaches the drivers’
personal privacy. For instance, the accelerating & braking
data, trips, turning behaviors, risky driving hours, and even
the geographical locations the driver can be inferred from the
data violating their personal privacy. The goal of this research
is to securely build a classifier that accurately predicts any
given driver’s driving style (aggressive or defensive) without
compromising any participating party’s privacy.
There are two phases in driving style recognition: (1)
building a classifier with vehicles’ historical traveling data; (2)
predicting the driving style for new drivers using the classifier.
1) In phase (1), some drivers’ historical vehicle traveling
data are analyzed to train the classifier. As part of
this process, each record has a class label applied
to it, the characteristics of an aggressively labeled
driver would be based on the records of individuals
who had received speeding tickets or been involved
in an accident, while a defensive driver would be
an individual who had not been in such situations.
Each driver privately holds a record of his/her vehicle
traveling data with the attributes such as average ac-
celeration (m/s2), average deceleration in the braking
events (m/s2), average turning (degrees), # of risky
driving hours, and # of trips [19]. In reality, both of
the driver and insurance company know the driver’s
class label in the training data from the traffic tickets,
reported accidents, etc. Therefore, such multiparty
classifier training process has a hybrid scenario of
data partitions: first, all the drivers’ records are hori-
zontally partitioned – each driver privately holds a
record, including the class label [27]; second, the
overall data (attributes) is also vertically partitioned
[27] into two shares – the insurance company holds
a share (the attribute class label) while all the drivers
jointly holds both shares, including the class label.
Finally, the output of phase (1) is a trained classifier,
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privately held by the insurance company.
2) In phase (2), the insurance company privately holds
its classifier whereas the new driver privately holds
his/her vehicle traveling data. Since the two parties
privately own different attributes, it is a vertical parti-
tion case in each individual driving style recognition.
Then, they jointly predict the class label (aggressive
or defensive) with their private inputs.
Since the data partitions in the previous two phases are
mixed with both horizontal and vertical partitions, the prior
works on privacy-preserving classification [18], [27], [28], [29]
are not directly applicable to this research problem.
A. Research Contributions
In this paper, we develop privacy-preserving techniques for
two phases of driving style recognition based on decision tree
induction [23]. More specifically, in phase (1), each driver
only knows its vehicle traveling data (a record) and its class
label; the insurance company only knows all the drivers’ class
labels, and the final output – a decision tree. In phase (2), each
new driver only knows its vehicle traveling data (a record)
and learns nothing but the driving style recognition result; the
insurance company only knows its input (the decision tree)
and also learns nothing but the driving style recognition result.
Thus, the main contributions are summarized as below:
1) We propose two secure communication protocols un-
der secure multiparty computation (SMC) [30], [6] to
implement the two phases of driving style recognition
(based on decision trees) for the participating parties
without private information disclosure.
2) We analyze the privacy risks for all the participating
parties in the secure communication protocols for
both classifier training and driving style prediction.
3) We experimentally validate the performance of our
proposed approaches on the synthetic datasets gener-
ated following the format of data collected in [19].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first briefly review the related work in Section II. Then,
we present the algorithms and demonstrate the experimental
results in Sections III and IV respectively. Finally, we conclude
this paper and discuss the future work in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Vehicle traveling data has been commonly collected for
analysis in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Ly et
al. [19] demonstrated a methodology to collect vehicle data
(e.g., accelerating, braking, turning) using inertial sensors.
Hull et al. [16] collected the vehicle data with his CarTel
system. There has also been expansive work into adaptive
cruise control, which uses prediction algorithms to adapt to
the road based on curve patterns [31]. Moreover, Rass et al.
[24] formulated a system to provide feedback on the driving
habits. Also, other research has focused on driver modeling
& evaluation [21], [17] and maneuver recognition [25]. While
there has been a variety of ventures into many ITS applications,
only a surprising few of these tackled such arising privacy
concerns, including: Hoh et al. [8] proposed using the virtual
trip lines to monitor traffic conditions while preserving privacy.
Checkoway et al. [2] examined the attack vectors for hackers
to infiltrate vehicle through its Electronic Control Unit. Han
et al. evaluated authentication methods for securely integrating
mobile devices in vehicular networks [7]. To the best of our
knowledge, privacy risks in driving style recognition have not
been systematically studied.
Privacy-preserving schemes are generally developed based
on data transformation and/or secure computation. The former
one transforms the original data to a privacy-compliant format
and minimizes the utility loss in the process of data transforma-
tion (e.g., k-anonymity [26], differential privacy [3]). The latter
makes two or more parties jointly compute a function possible
without revealing private data to each other (formally defined
as Secure Multiparty Computation [30]). The function can be
as simple as sum or as complex as big data analysis/mining
[1], [18], [9]. Several researchers have addressed the privacy
concerns in other contexts, such as classification [18], [29],
[27], location based services [5], search engine queries [10],
[11], [14], scheduling [15], transportation [13], and smart
grid [12]. Following a similar line of research, we develop a
privacy-preserving driving style recognition technique that can
analyze the vehicle traveling data (e.g., an insurance company)
without breaching participating parties’ privacy.
III. SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
In this paper, we assume that the adversaries are semi-
honest. The semi-honest model in Secure Multiparty Compu-
tation (SMC) [30], [6] defines that the adversaries are honest
to follow the a given protocol, but are curious to infer private
information from each other. Two secure communication pro-
tocols will be given for two phases of driving style recognition
in Sections III-A and III-A1 respectively.
A. Phase (1): Privacy Preserving Classifier Training
In phase (1) of driving style recognition, a set of drivers and
the insurance company jointly derive a decision tree based on
the drivers’ vehicle traveling data and class labels (aggressive
or defensive). In this scenario, we have:
• Every driver’s class label in the training data is known
by both the driver and the insurance company. Since
the “Aggressive” class label in the historical data can
be derived from the “traffic tickets or accidents” which
is indeed known by both parties in real world.
• All drivers and the insurance company know the name
of every attribute in the dataset, such as Acceleration
Events (#), Average Acceleration (m/s2), Braking
Events (#), and Average Braking (m/s2). Insurance
company initializes the attributes in the sensors which
are also known to the drivers in real world.
• Every attribute has a threshold to divide the values
into two categories: “less than the threshold” or “no
less than the threshold”. For example, the average
deceleration when braking can be less than a threshold
4.9m/s2 or no less than a threshold. Such split is used
to determine the branches of a node on the decision
tree. We assume that every attribute’s threshold is
known to all the drivers and the insurance company
(e.g., thresholds of speed/mileage/acceleration/braking
can be available as public information).
Note that our privacy-preserving decision tree training is
extended from the ID3 Algorithm [23], [18], which iteratively
finds the best attribute to split values based on its threshold
(as the current node of the tree) by comparing the entropy
or information gain of all the remaining attributes in the
classification results. In this paper, we choose the entropy
as the measure of uncertainty in the threshold based split
H = −∑x∈X p(x)logp(x) where X is the set of classes
(“Aggressive” or “Defensive”) and p(x) is the proportion of the
number of elements in class x to the number of elements in all
the data. Therefore, in a distributed manner, each driver/vehicle
owns a record and they should securely sum their shares
for every p(x). In this section, we first present the Secure
Sum algorithm which is iteratively invoked by the protocol of
privacy-preserving classifier training.
1) Secure Sum: The secure sum algorithm is developed us-
ing Homomorphic Cryptosystem (e.g., Paillier [22]). It begins
by having the insurance company I generate a key pair: a
public key pk and a private key sk. The insurance company
(party I) then sends the public key pk to all m drivers, denoted
as D1, . . . , Dm. D1 then encrypts its share and passes along
the encrypted data to the next driver (w.l.o.g, say D2). D2 then
computes their encrypted sum to the previous number and this
is passed through all the m drivers in the circuit. After this, the
encrypted sum is passed back to the insurance company who
decrypts it with the private key sk to get the sum. As shown
in Algorithm 1, all the parties’ data remains private while only
allowing the insurance company to obtain the sum.
Algorithm 1 Secure Sum
Input: m drivers’ share of p(x): p(x)1, . . . , p(x)m
Output: insurance company I learns p(x) =
∑m
j=1 p(x)j
1: I generates a pair of public-private key (pk, sk) and sends
the public key pk to P1, . . . , Pn
2: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
3: Di encrypts p(x)i using pk to get E[p(x)i], and
computes E[
∑i
j=1 p(x)j ] =
∏i−1
j=1E[p(x)j ] ∗ E[p(x)i]
(ensured by Homomorphic Property [22])
4: Di sends E[
∑i
j=1 p(x)j ] to the next party Pi+1 (if i =
m, the next party is I)
5: end for
6: I decrypts E[
∑m
j=1 p(x)j ] with its private key sk to obtain∑m
j=1 p(x)j
2) Secure Communication Protocol: In the secure commu-
nication protocol for classifier training, the insurance company
I repeatedly finds the best attribute (that has the smallest
entropy H; viz. lowest uncertainty) as the current node during
the construction of the tree. Note that the key value p(x) in the
entropy H = −∑∀x∈X p(x) log p(x) is split into m shares
p(x)1, . . . , p(x)m, held by m vehicles respectively. In each
iteration, each of the remaining attributes’ p(x) is securely
summed by all m vehicles and the insurance company I
(Algorithm 1). This use of the secure sum ensures that I is only
ever able to learn the p(x) of each attribute while preserving
the privacy of each of the m vehicles.
In turn, the only information that is learned by each of m
vehicles is the pk that is sent by the insurance company I .
The purpose of this approach is to provide a mechanism to
securely sum the data needed to compute the entropy values
for each attribute while obfuscating all vehicle identifying
characteristics in p(x)1, . . . , p(x)m. In addition, the use of the
secure sum ensures that no other parties will be able to uncover
the identity of any vehicle or the vehicle’s collected data.
In the final phase of this algorithm, I locally computes
the entropy H of all the remaining attributes, and selects the
attribute with the smallest entropy value as the current node.
This process is performed iteratively until all the leaf nodes
of the decision tree have p(x) = 1. The details of the secure
communication protocol is given in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 2 Privacy Preserving Classifier Training
Input: m is the total number of drivers/vehicles
Output: Decision tree T
1: while existing a leaf node’s p(x)! = 1 do
2: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
3: Driver Di computes the share of p(x) for all the
remaining attributes
4: end for
5: Securely sum shares of p(x) (Algorithm 1) for all the
remaining attributes (only party I knows that)
6: I computes entropy H = −∑i=1 p(x)logp(x) for all
the remaining attributes
7: I selects the best attribute (smallest entropy) as the root
or leaf node (leaf node is added along the branch of the
tree with p(x)! = 1)
8: end while
The final product of this algorithm consists of a decision
tree which contains a set of the attributes from the dataset.
This tree outlines the pathways which represent determinable
outcomes based on any given driver’s collection of vehicle
traveling data. This tree will be used to help securely predict
a given new driver as either aggressive or defensive.
B. Phase (2): Privacy-preserving Driving Style Recognition
The insurance company has the means to classify driving
style/behavior for given drivers, but has an equal interest in
keeping its decision tree T private. To this end, we develop
another secure communication protocol to predict the driving
styles without sharing information between the insurance com-
pany and the new driver, detailed below.
Definition 1 (Aggressive Path in Decision Tree T ): is de-
fined as a path in the decision tree T that leads to the class of
aggressive driving.
Letting |T | be the number of aggressive paths in T , with
all the thresholds of the attributes in T , each aggressive path
can be represented by an n-digit binary vector:
∀i ∈ [1, |T |], ~ci = [ci1, ci2, . . . , cin] (1)
where ∀cij ∈ {0, 1}. Note that, in the decision tree T ,
cij = 1 means the child value of the jth attribute (out of all
n attributes in total) along the aggressive path ~ci exceeds the
threshold value; otherwise, cij = 0. For instance, in Figure 1,
there are six attributes in total used for training decision tree,
and four of them are utilized to build the tree T (as shown
in Figure 1(a)). Two paths in T : “# of acceleration events
< 110 −→ # of braking events ≥ 150 −→ average braking
(m/s2) ≥ 4.9m/s2” and “# of acceleration Events ≥ 110 −→
high risk driving hours ≥ 80” can lead to “Aggressive”. Then,
they can be represented as two binary vectors (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
and (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) respectively. Other paths in T are simply
considered as “Defensive Paths” which can be also represented
as n-digit binary vector in a similar way.
(a) Decision Tree
(b) Aggressive and Defensive Paths
Fig. 1. An Example of Decision Tree and Aggressive/Defensive Paths
The insurance company I now owns the decision tree T ,
the number of aggressive paths |T |, as well as the path(s) that
identify aggressive driving behavior ~c|T |. Since the insurance
company privately possesses such information, the aggressive
paths must be encrypted for computation. Specifically, I gen-
erates a public/private key pair (pk, sk) based on the Paillier
cryptosystem [22]. I encrypts the aggressive paths from the
decision tree and the total number of aggressive paths |T | as
well as the inner products of all the aggressive paths (which
is the total number of “1” in each binary vector) using the
public key pk such that: E(~c1), . . . , E( ~c|T |) and E(~c1 · ~c1),
. . . , E( ~c|T | · ~c|T |) are both then transmitted along with pk to
the new driver/vehicle D.
At the other end, similar to the aggressive/defensive paths,
the new driver D privately holds a:
Definition 2 (Vehicle Traveling Vector ~v): is an n-digit bi-
nary vector: ~v = [v1, v2, . . . , vn] with 0 representing the
attributes with values below the threshold, and otherwise 1.
After receiving pk and the ciphertexts from the insurance
company I , the driver/vehicle D then securely computes the
following scalar products with the ciphertexts and its vector ~v:
∀i ∈ [1, |T |], E(~ci · ~v) = E(ci1)v1 ∗ E(ci2)v2 ∗ · · · ∗ E(cin)vn
(2)
Then, driver/vehicle D encrypts ~v and computes:
∀i ∈ [1, |T |], E(~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci) = E(~ci · ~v)
E(~ci · ~ci) (3)
If any of ∀i ∈ [1, |T |], ~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci equals 0, the vehicle
traveling vector ~v would match the corresponding aggressive
path, and the driver D is predicted as an aggressive driver.
If all of ∀i ∈ [1, |T |], ~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci are non zero, the
vehicle traveling vector ~v would not match any aggressive
path, and the driver D can be predicted as a defensive driver.
To minimize information disclosure, the driver permutes all
the ciphertexts ∀i ∈ [1, |T |], E(~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci) and send them
to the insurance company I one by one, and I decrypts a
ciphertext immediately. As long as a 0 is found, conclude D
as an aggressive driver and terminate the protocol (no more
ciphertext will be sent). If no 0 is found after examining all
|T | results, then conclude D as an defensive driver. I can share
the classification result to D if necessary.
Algorithm 3 Privacy Preserving Driving Style Recognition
Input: Insurance company I and a new driver D;
D’s vehicle traveling vector ~v;
T represents the complete decision tree;
The number of aggressive paths |T |;
All the aggressive paths ~c1, . . . , ~c|T |
Output: The new driver is aggressive or not
{A random nonce is generated for every single encryption}
1: Party I generates a public/private key pair based on Paillier
Cryptosystem (pk, sk)
2: I encrypts ~c1, . . . , ~c|T |, |T |, and inner products ~c1 · ~c1, . . . ,
~c|T | · ~c|T | using pk to obtain E(~c1), . . . , E( ~c|T |), E(~c1 · ~c1),
. . . , E( ~c|T | · ~c|T |), and sends the ciphertexts and pk to the
driver D
3: D encrypts ~v and computes the ciphertexts of |T | scalar
products E(~c1 · ~v), . . . , E( ~c|T | · ~v) using Equation 2
4: V computes E(~c1 ·~v− ~c1 · ~c1), . . . , E( ~c|T | ·~v− ~c|T | · ~c|T |)
using Equation 3 and permutes them
5: for i = 1, . . . , |T | do
6: D sends the permuted ciphertext E(~ci · ~v− ~ci · ~ci) to I
7: I decrypts the current E(~ci ·~v− ~ci · ~ci) using its private
key sk to get ~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci
8: if ~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci = 0 then
9: D is an aggressive driver and terminate the algorithm
10: end if
11: end for
12: if ∀i ∈ [1, |T |], ~ci · ~v − ~ci · ~ci 6= 0 then
13: D is a defensive driver
14: end if
Upon completion, each driver has the ability to access his
or her computed rating of either aggressive or defensive. I has
sole possession of the decision tree T developed from training
data and is the only party which is able to view all of the
pathways which lead to an aggressive classification. The driver
D, on the other hand, is the only party able to access ~v, keeping
specific driving behavioral data private from I . Ultimately,
both parties will have access to the computed classification
result. However, the insurance company can only infer some
trivial information from D such as how many values in ~v has
met or exceeded the corresponding attributes’ threshold.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented application of privacy-preserving driving
style recognition in Java on a PC with AMD FX-4350 4.55
GHZ CPU and 16G RAM. Synthetic datasets are generated
falling into a similar value range as [19]. 7500 drivers’ vehicle
traveling data are generated for training classifier (with class
labels in the training data) while 2500 drivers’ traveling data
are generated for predicting the driving style by the classifier
(without class labels in the dataset). These records simulated
driving activity over a 6-month period and featured 9 attributes:
• total number of trips taken
• total mileage driven
• the number of acceleration events
• the average amount of acceleration
• the number of braking events
• the average deceleration when braking
• the average number of degrees turned
• the total number of hard braking events
• the hours driven in the highest risk time (0 to 4 AM)
The cryptographic keys are generated with lengths of 512
and 1024-bit using Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem [22].
For examining the computational costs, we tested the over-
all runtime of the protocols including encryption, computation
and decryption. For examining the communication overheads,
we tested the overall bandwidth consumption, which is equiv-
alent to the overall size of the ciphertexts and plaintexts to be
transmitted among all the distributed parties in the protocols.
Due to the novelty of the data partition scenario and protocols
devised for driving style prediction, there are no available
benchmarks to compare against.
A. Classifier Training
Algorithm 2 securely trains a decision tree out of the
privately held distributed records. We conducted a group of
experiments for classifier training (Algorithm 2) using 1000,
2000, 3000, 4000 and 5000 drivers’ traveling data featuring 9
attributes. In each group of experiments, we tested the runtime
for the encryption and decryption as well as the size of all
the ciphertexts. As shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b), both the
computational cost and the communication overheads present
a linear increase trend as the number of vehicles increases.
B. Driving Style Recognition
Algorithm 3 securely predicts the class for new individual
drivers. Since the algorithm runs driving style recognition for
all the drivers individually, we tested its computational costs
and communication overheads again for a predicting a single
driver’s class. A group of experiments is conducted with a
(a) Computational Cost
(b) Communication Overheads
Fig. 2. Privacy Preserving Driving Style Classifier Training (Algorithm 2)
varying number of aggressive paths in the decision tree: |T | =
1, . . . , 10. As shown in Figure 3(a) and 3(b), the costs increase
slowly as the number of aggressive paths |T | increases.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have developed two secure communica-
tion protocols to tackle the privacy concerns in the two phases
of driving style recognition among the insurance company
and various vehicles. Participating parties can jointly train a
decision tree based on the vehicles’ historical traveling data
without compromising their privacy. The insurance company
can also use its decision tree to securely predict the driving
style (aggressive or defensive) of any given driver with limited
disclosure. We have also experimentally validated the perfor-
mance of our proposed secure communication protocols.
In the future, we have several directions to extend this
work. First, we assume a semi-honest adversarial model in this
paper such that every participant will follow the outlined secure
communication protocols. In the real world, one or multiple
parties may become more malicious to corrupt the protocol
for additional payoff, or even collude with each other to
breach privacy or jeopardize the utility of the protocol. We will
explore efficient solutions to address the security and privacy
concerns for multiparty driving style recognition in malicious
adversarial model. Second, maybe more than one entities (e.g.,
multiple insurance companies and police department) would
like to collaboratively predict the driving style of the drivers
(a) Computational Cost
(b) Communication Overheads
Fig. 3. Privacy Preserving Driving Style Recognition (Algorithm 3)
with their private inputs. Introducing more parties into this
problem will influence the data partition scenario, and then the
required secure communication protocols might be thoroughly
different from the current ones. Third, in the future, vehicles’
traveling data used for driving style recognition might be in
real-time format rather than the historical aggregated format.
In such scenario, the challenges on efficiency and bandwidth
should be resolved.
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